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Abstract
The A-theory of time insists that there is some real ontological fact about what is 
present. It is often alleged that this theory is inconsistent with the theory of special rela-
tivity. The conflict originates with the radar definition of simultaneity (RDS in my paper). 
I argue that the only argument for RDS is the argument for the dispensability of absolute 
rest; there is no good reason to accept the Newtonian concept of absolute rest and we 
can do perfectly well without it. I argue that there may be reasons to accept absolute rest. 
The notion seems to play an important part in our understanding of certain possible 
worlds. I go on to argue that it isn’t at all clear that the B-theoy of time is consistent with 
special relativity. It accepts the empirically unverifiable entity called minkowsky space-
time. It is thus ostensibly committed to there being facts that go beyond merely what we 
can measure with RDS.
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The two broadest categories in the
philosophy of time are the A-theory and
the B-theory. The labels come from John
Mctaggart. He believed that there were two
characteristics which one might ascribe to
time. Let’s think of time as a sequence built
out of discrete portions called time slices.
One rather obvious feature of the sequence
is that the individual slices are ordered. At
least part of what it means for a time se-
quence to have happened is that the time
segments that compose it were ordered in
a certain way. When I see the lightning bolt
at some time, t1, and hear the thunder at
some time t2, it seems right to say that t1
is earlier than t2. This aspect of time is what
Mctaggart calls the B-relations. These re-
lationships include being earlier than, be-
ing later than, or being simultaneous with.
It might also be thought, however, that
there is more to time than just the linear
ordering of instances of time. Perhaps there
is some fact of the matter about what time
is actual, real, or present. It seems natural,
for example, for us to say that dinosaurs
do not exist, although they once did. On
the face of it, this seems to indicate that
the present is ontologically privileged; that
the past is less real. If this way of speaking
reflects the deep metaphysical facts, then
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in order to tell the whole truth about the
timeline of our world, one would need not
only the facts about how the time slices
(and the events that occupy them) are or-
dered, but also facts about which of the
times is the real ‘now’. The A-properties
include the properties of being past, being
present, and being future. The B-theorist,
then, is one who believes we can build an
accurate and complete theory of time us-
ing only the B-relations. The A-theorist,
on the other hand, believes that a satisfac-
tory theory of time must appeal to A-prop-
erties. One common objection to the A-
theory of time is that it is inconsistent with
one of our best, most well confirmed sci-
entific theories, the theory of special rela-
tivity (SR hereafter).1 In this paper, I will
attempt to offer a plausible response to this
objection. In section 1, I explain Einstein’s
radar definition of simultaneity (RDS here-
after), and examine his reasons for accept-
ing it. In section 2, I will clarify the relativ-
ity objection and offer an example of it from
the literature. As we will see, the problem
is that the A-theory is inconsistent with
RDS, which is an integral part of SR. In
section 3, I cast doubt on Einstein’s argu-
ment for RDS. I argue that the proponent
of the relativity objection against the A-
theory has more work to do to make the
objection cogent. In section 4, I will argue
that it is unclear that the B-theory is con-
sistent with RDS. I conclude that the spe-
cial relativity objection to presentism is
unpersuasive.2
Section 1. The Radar Definition of
Simulteneity
Einstein begins his 1905 paper with a
brief discussion of the problem that moti-
vates his new theory.  He is troubled by
“certain asymmetries in classical physics”
that arise from the relative motion of a
magnet and an electric conductor.3 In clas-
sical physics, the explanation for a certain
electromagnetic phenomena depends on
which of them is ‘really’ in motion. “For if
the magnet is in motion and the conductor
at rest, there arises in the neighbour- hood
of the magnet an electric field with a cer-
tain definite energy, producing a current at
the places where parts of the conductor are
situated”.4  If, on the other hand, the con-
ductor is moving, we find, not an electric
field, but an “electromotive force” that “as-
suming the equality of relative motion gives
rise to electric currents of the same path
and intensity”.5
Examples of this sort, together with the
unsuccessful attempts to discover any mo-
tion of the earth relative to the “light me-
dium”, suggest that the phenomena of
electromagnetics as well as mechanics pos-
sess no properties corresponding to the
idea of absolute rest.6
There is some debate about how and
to what extent the Michelson-Morley ex-
periments influenced Einstein’s theorizing
about the issue.7 What seems clear from
the text, however is that there are two facts
that seem to license Einstein’s denial of ab-
solute rest: (1) “absolute rest” had given
rise to a difference that made no empiri-
cally verifiable difference to the prediction
of electric currents and (2) there had been
a failure to detect absolute rest.
Einstein then offers two postulates
upon which he will build his new theory.
One is the relativity postulate, which he
accepts in part in virtue of parsimony.8 He
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thinks that it is simpler to assume that not
merely some, but all of nature’s laws are
relative.9 There are different ways of for-
mulating these postulates, but for present
purposes, the following will do:
(R) All inertial frames are indistinguish-
able
(L) Light travels at a constant velocity
in all frames.10
Einstein notes that there seems to be a
problem here. It seems that L is in conflict
with R.
The reason the light postulate seemed
to contradict the relativity postulate was
that if a signal moved at a finite velocity c
regardless of its source’s motion, then a
receiver moving toward the source at ve-
locity v should measure the signal’s veloc-
ity at c+v and a receiver moving away from
the source should measure the signal’s ve-
locity at c-v.11
The problem here is not that the veloc-
ity of light does not vary from frame to
frame.  As Craig says, this would be in har-
mony with the principle of relativity rather
than ostensibly contradictory to it.12 The
problem is that the velocity of light is inde-
pendent of its source.  In classical mechan-
ics, the measurement of the velocity of two
objects in relative motion is determined by
adding and subtracting their velocities. If
a car is moving at 50 mph, and I am mov-
ing in the same direction at 30 mph on a
bicycle, then I ought to measure the speed
of the car at 20 mph. If, on the other hand
I am moving at 30 mph toward the car and
the car is moving at 50 mph toward me,
then I ought to measure the speed of the
car at 80 mph. “Only if the signal were trav-
eling at zero or infinity would the law of
addition (or subtraction) of velocities
fail”.13 If the law of the addition of veloci-
ties holds and the speed of light is constant,
finite, and non-zero, then contrary to the
relativity postulate, there ought to be a way
of distinguishing inertial frames of refer-
ence from one another. We would be able
to distinguish inertial frames by measuring
our velocity relative to the speed of light.
As we will see, this problem will be solved
through his new RDS, which relativizes the
durations used to calculate velocities within
frames.
Einstein, showing his verificationist
tendencies, indicates that he would be per-
fectly happy to define local time as “the
position of the small hand on my watch”,
but he notes that this will not do for spa-
tially distant events, since we have no way
to ensure that the clocks in question will
be synchronized.14  Einstein takes the oc-
currence of local simultaneity as a primi-
tive, declining to “discus the inexactitude
which lurks in the concept of simultaneity
of two events at approximately the same
place…”.15  He then establishes, “by defi-
nition” that the velocity of light in one di-
rection is constant.16 With these two tools
in hand, Einstein then offers us a definition
of the synchronicity of two spatially dis-
tant clocks. Suppose that two observers,
A and B, are in spatially separated non-
intertial motion with one another. Suppose
that at a specified time, ta, A sends a light
signal to B, which B reflects back to A at
another specified time, tb, and is then re-
ceived by A at a specified time ta’.17 The
clocks of A and B are “defined to be syn-
chronized if tb-ta=ta’-tb”.18 Equivalently
tb=1/2(ta’-ta).19, 20
It follows then, that what events are
William Demsar
42
simultaneous depends on one’s state of
motion. Consider Einstein’s famous ex-
ample of the moving train. Consider two
persons, one of whom is standing on the
platform and the other is riding on top of
the moving train. There is a mark in the
exact middle of the platform, and the man
on the platform is standing on this mark.
As the train passes the platform, and the
two men are aligned, two lightning bolts
strike, one directly in front of the train, and
the other directly behind it. If we define
simultaneity, as we have above, as the re-
ception of light signals, what shall we say
about the lightning bolts? Were the two
lightning strikes simultaneous? As the two
bolts of lightning are equidistant from the
man on the platform, he will judge them to
be simultaneous. The person on the train
however, because he is in motion toward
one of the bolts and in motion away from
the other, will first observe the light from
the signal in the front of the train. He will
judge that the lighting bolt in the front of
the train struck before the bolt in the rear
of the train. Of course, because all pos-
sible observers of the events in question
will be observers who are themselves in
motion or at rest relative to the other
frames, there is, in principle, no experimen-
tal way to decide which events are really
simultaneous. Because, according to
Einstein, there is nothing more to simulta-
neity that the reception of light signals, we
ought to say, not just that the observers
disagree, but that there is no fact of the
matter.
With RDS in hand, we now have the
resources to deal with the problem of the
ostensible conflict between R and L caused
by the addition of velocities. You will re-
member that it was alleged that a person in
motion toward a light signal ought to mea-
sure the velocity of the light signal at c+v
while someone moving away from the light
signal should measure it at c-v. If this were
so, then, R would be false. The problem
was that we had assumed that the time used
to calculate velocity within the one frame
is equal to the time used to calculate ve-
locity in the other. Using the present defi-
nition, this is simply false.
Many A-theorists have alleged that
Einstein’s Radar Definition of Simultane-
ity (RDS) is based on “profoundly
verificationist assumptions”.21  Remember,
Einstein seems to have based his rejection
of absolute rest on two facts (1) “absolute
rest” had given rise to a difference that
made no empirically verifiable difference
to the prediction of electric currents and
(2) there had been a failure to detect abso-
lute rest. Certainly (1) and (2) are compel-
ling reasons to abandon the concept of
absolute rest if one is a verificationist about
meaning. Is Einstein’s abandonment of ab-
solute rest here merely some kind of
verificationist inference from the fact that
we have not (or cannot?) detected abso-
lute rest which is then used to draw the
conclusion that either it does not exist or it
does not have meaning? There is evidence
that suggests an affirmative answer. As the
philosopher of physics Amit Hagar notes:
Einstein’s “principle” approach to
physics in STR [Special Theory of
Relativity] differs from the construc-
tive approach of Lorentz in two major
ways.  As the late eminent CERN physi-
cist John S. Bell (1987) notes, there is
a difference in style and a difference in
philosophy…The difference in philoso-
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phy is that since the question of which
uniformly moving reference frame is
really at rest is experimentally unde-
terminable, Einstein--later to be joined
by the logical positivists such as Schlick
and Reichenbach--declares the notions
“real rest” and “real motion” as mean-
ingless.22
In this same book, Einstein states:
THE PURPOSE OF MECHANICS IS
TO DESCRIBE HOW BODIES
change their position in space with
time’. I should load my conscience with
grave sins against the sacred spirit of
lucidity were I to formulate the aims
of mechanics in this way, without seri-
ous reflections and detailed explana-
tions. Let us proceed to disclose these
sins. It is not clear what is to be under-
stood here by “position” and “space”…
In the first place, we entirely shun the
vague word “space” of which, we must
honestly acknowledge, we cannot form
the slightest conception, and we re-
place it by “motion relative to a practi-
cally rigid body of reference”.23
From this quote, it seems that Einstein
wants to get rid of the old Newtonian con-
cept of absolute space and replace it with
something concrete and empirically verifi-
able, like a “practically rigid body of refer-
ence”.24  On the other hand, there are those
who contend that Einstein, at the time of
his 1905 paper, intended to take no stance
toward the ontological status of space and
time. In a letter to Paul Ehrenfest, in 1907,
Einstein remarks:
The Principle of Relativity or--more
exactly put--the Principle of Relativity
together with the Principle of the Con-
stancy of Light Velocity is not to be
conceived as a ‘closed system’, indeed
not as a system at all, but merely as a
heuristic principle, which in and of it-
self contains only statements about
rigid bodies, clocks, and light signals.25
Here it sounds as if he has a merely
instrumental view of his theory, and be-
lieves it to have little to tell us about the
deep metaphysics of space and time.26 I do
not know what Einstein’s metaphysical be-
liefs were, though I find it likely that they
varied greatly over time.27 It is widely ac-
cepted that Einstein wanted to get rid of
the concepts of absolute space and time.
But even this reading of Einstein remains
unclear to me. It is not clear, for example,
whether Einstein viewed the concept of
absolute rest as “meaningless” or as merely
“superfluous”.28, 29 Clearly, all meaningless
concepts are, in some sense, superfluous,
but arguably, a concept cannot be both
meaningless and vague.30 What is clear is
that Einstein was deeply influenced by
positivistic thinkers like David Hume and
Ernst Mach.31 Perhaps we should view
Einstein here as a positivist before positiv-
ism was cool.32 Or perhaps we should see
him as an Occamist, influenced by
verificationism, who is offering us a not
wholly unpersuasive dispensability argu-
ment against the traditional Newtonian
concepts.33 Perhaps, that is, Einstein’s
thought was simply that, since we can do
physics perfectly well without the concepts
of absolute rest and duration, consider-
ations of parsimony dictate that we ought
to dispense with them.  Because
“verificationism has retreated into the ob-
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scurity it so richly deserves”, it is tempting
for the A-theorist to objurgate Einstein’s
RDS as merely verificationist.34 But I think
this is mistaken. Although heavily influ-
enced by verificationistic philosophy, con-
siderations of parsimony and theoretical
elegance clearly played a role in his think-
ing. There were other explanations for the
failure of physics to detect the absolute
frame, e.g. the contraction hypothesis of
Lorentz, but Einstein rejected this move
as “ad hoc and artificial”.35 He accepted R
in part, because he thought that it would
be, a-priori, implausible that the principle
of the relativity would apply so well to
some laws (motion) and not to others (elec-
trodynamics). He seems to have accepted
L, at least in part, on the basis of experi-
mental evidence.36 Furthermore, as has
been noted, Einstein’s adoption of RDS
does play a theoretical role of resolving the
apparent inconsistency of R and L that
arises when one considers the addition of
velocities. The matter is by no means
settled, but I think that the strongest argu-
ment to be made here for RDS is an argu-
ment from parsimony. To be more precise,
there are two considerations here. First,
absolute rest, were it to exist, would be
experimentally undeterminable, and there-
fore, we don’t have any evidence of it.37
Furthermore, Einstein has shown us that,
by adopting RDS, we can do away with
the Newtonian concept of absolute rest. So,
since we have no reason to believe in ab-
solute rest, and we can do without it, we
ought to reject it, and adopt RDS in its
place. In the following section I will at-
tempt to bring out more clearly how SR
comes into conflict with A-theory and the
role that RDS plays in that conflict.
Section 2. What’s the problem?
Theodore Sider, in his book, Four
Dimensionalism, considers the relativity
objection to be the “fatal blow to
presentism”.38  He sums up the objection
as follows:
The notion of the present time that is
so crucial to presentism is meaningless
within Minkowski spacetime, in which
there is…no observer-independent no-
tion of simultaneity”.39 …I have said
that simultaneity is not well defined in
Minkowsky space-time, but what is
strictly speaking true is that absolute
simultaneity is not well defined. A rela-
tive notion of simultaneity can be de-
fined via the Einsteinian ‘radar’ defini-
tion of simultaneity for a given
observer…Simultaneity thus defined
varies depending on the state of mo-
tion of the observer…40
The A-theorist believes that in order
“to tell the full truth about time…one must
avert to the A-properties”.41 For the A-
theorist, the facts about what events are
simultaneous with the present confers a
very important ontological status upon
them. The problem is that according to
RDS, the facts about what events are si-
multaneous vary depending on one’s state
of motion. The A-theorist, it seems, faces
quite an unpalatable consequence. It seems
she must say that the events bearing the
special A-theoretic property of being
present vary from frame to frame, depend-
ing on one’s state of motion. Now this is
rather bizarre because it means she will
have to say that the facts about which
events are imbued with a special ontologi-
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cal status will depend on one’s frame of
reference. The presentist, for example, be-
lieves that all and only those events that
are simultaneous with the present exist. The
presentist, then, must say that what there
is in the world, depends on our state of
motion. From our current frame of refer-
ence, it is true that dinosaurs do not exist,
but perhaps there are frames of reference
from which it is the case that dinosaurs do
exist.42
The A-theorist believes that the fact
that an event is present endows it with a
special ontological status that is not shared
by events that take place at other times.
For the presentist, this special status is ex-
istence, but presentism is only one kind of
A-theory. Other A-theorists believe that
other times have some reality. According
to one theory, time is like a growing block.
The past and the present exist, but the fu-
ture does not. The edge of the growing
block marks the boundary between exist-
ence and non-existence. Thus, if the grow-
ing block A-theorist says that the events
constituted by the edge of the block vary
depending on one’s state of motion, she
too will be forced to say that the facts about
what events exist are dependent on one’s
state of motion. According to another
theory, all times, past, present, and future,
have some sort of reality but it is merely
that the present moment is ‘illuminated’ by
a spotlight. The flow of time, the change
from will be, to is, to was, can be thought
of as the movement of this spotlight across
the various times. The present illuminated
moment is somehow more real than the
others. Again, it is strange to think that the
events which posses the special reality of
the present will vary with frames of refer-
ence. SR poses a problem for any A-theory
of time.  Because SR, via RDS, leads to a
relativization of the simultaneity of events,
it also leads to a relativization of the A-
theoretic properties of those events. It
seems implausible, however, that such os-
tensibly objective facts about the ontologi-
cal status of events, i.e. which events are
real or exist, should depend on something
as varied and contingent as one’s velocity.
The A-theorist then, must either reject a
well-confirmed scientific theory, or accept
the consequences. In the next section, I
attempt to offer the A-theorist a way out
of this dilemma. As we saw in section 1,
there are two persuasive reasons to accept
RDS. The first is that we have no reason
to accept the Newtonian notion of abso-
lute rest. The second is that we can do per-
fectly well without it by accepting RDS.
In the next section, I will try to undercut
this support for RDS. I will attempt to pro-
vide some reason to hold on to the
Newtonian concept of absolute rest and to
reject RDS as a metaphysically appropri-
ate notion of simultaneity.  I will argue that,
while Newton may have no place in our
physics, we ought to welcome him in our
metaphysics.
Section 3. Dear is Einstein, dearer still
is truth
As we have seen, Einstein’s reasons for
rejecting the Newtonian concepts of abso-
lute rest and duration are twofold. First,
he argues, we have no reason to believe
that there are properties that correspond
to these concepts. Second, we can do very
well without them. The argument here,
against the Newtonian concepts, consti-
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tutes an argument for RDS in that RDS is
the means by which we are able to dispense
with Newton in our physics. In this sec-
tion, I want to question Einstein’s dispens-
ability argument. Is it really true that we
have no reason to believe that there is such
a thing as absolute rest? There is no em-
pirical reason to accept that there is any
such thing as absolute rest, but empirical
reasons aren’t the only ones we can have.
Consider the following 3 worlds that are
nomically very similar to ours:
World 1:  A world where there are only
two spheres attached to a string and in
rotation. Clearly there is a difference
between this world and the world
where the two spheres are not mov-
ing. In the world where they are mov-
ing, there will be an inertial force that
causes a tension in the string.44
World 2: A world in which there exists
only two fluid spheres A and B. Sphere
A is rotating and B is at rest. There will
be a difference between the spheres. In-
tuitively, sphere A will experience a
bulge and B will not. Yet, their relative
motion is identical. This world is dis-
tinguishable from other worlds where
B moves and A is at rest, worlds where
both spheres are in motion, and worlds
in which neither sphere is in rotational
motion.45
World 3: All of space-time is filled with
fluid matter. It seems that there is a pos-
sible world in which all of the matter is
uniformly rotating. And it seems that
this world is distinct from the world in
which the matter is not rotating.46
Of course, there are things that can be
said here in response. And space does not
permit of a more thorough treatment of the
issue. If push comes to shove, the propo-
nent of RDS can always deny that these
worlds really are possible. My aim here is
not to refute Einstein’s dispensability ar-
gument, but merely to cast doubt on it.
While it may be right that there are no
empirical reasons to believe in absolute
rest, it seems wrong to say that there are
no reasons. The objection to A-theory we
are considering is that the A-theory is in-
consistent with SR because it is inconsis-
tent with RDS. The only argument to be
found for RDS depends on the premise that
there is no reason to believe in absolute
rest. A prima facie reason to believe in ab-
solute rest, however, can be found in the
ostensive possibility of worlds like 1, 2, and
3. Perhaps these are, in the end, incorrect,
or unpersuasive reasons for believing in ab-
solute rest, but it won’t do to merely as-
sume this. If the B-theorist wants to make
the relativity objection stick, she needs to
give us some reason to accept RDS as a
metaphysically informative notion of si-
multaneity. If she wants to use Einstein’s
dispensability argument, then she owes us
some argument as to why worlds 1, 2, and
3 do not constitute a reason to believe in
absolute motion.
Section 4. Is B theory consistent with
Relativity?
If SR poses a problem for the A theory,
that problem arises from the fact that the
A-theory seems inconsistent with RDS. But
why should we think that a B-theory of time
fares any better? The B-theorist believes
that all of the time slices exist and have an
equivalent ontological status.47 She believes
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further that some of these time slices and
the events that are their contents bear the
relationship to one another of being si-
multaneous with. If she accepts RDS, she
also accepts that the events that bear this
relationship depend on one’s state of mo-
tion. This relationship may obtain or fail to
obtain depending on one’s state of motion.
Intuitively, it is the existence of the events
and the times, or perhaps individual
spacetime points, that serve as the real
‘truthmakers’ for the relationship,48 but the
existence of the times and events does not
change depending on one’s state of mo-
tion. If the relativization of the A-proper-
ties according to RDS seemed trouble-
some, it’s not so clear that the B proper-
ties are more well-behaved. Of course, B-
theorists are welcome to accept RDS and
thus attempt to make sense of the B-rela-
tions relativized to frames of reference. A-
theorists can (and do) play that game as
well.  My point is that, on the face of it,
there doesn’t seem to be any reason to think
that the B-theory is more hospitable to
RDS than A-theory and I’m surprised that
this point seems to go entirely overlooked.
I believe there is a deep tension be-
tween the spacetime realism that underlies
the B-theory, and the kind of reasoning that
might lead one to accept RDS. As we have
seen, the only argument to be found for
RDS involves a deep skepticism about
something as unverifiable as aether or mo-
tion relative to it. B-theory, on the other
hand, requires us to accept a notion of
spacetime that is just as unverifiable. We
can understand the parsimonious tastes of
the 1905 Einstein, influenced by
verificationist epistemology, attempting to
lay waste to all unverifiable entities. We can
understand why he would accept a more
or less operationalist notion of simultane-
ity. But why, once one has made the ardu-
ous journey from the parsimonious 1905
Einstein to the acceptance of ‘unverifiable’
entities like Minkowski spacetime,49 would
one feel the least bit inclined to accept RDS
as anything more than a useful tool for the
measurement and calculation of velocities?
It is easy to see how someone who is skep-
tical of absolute motion could come to be-
lieve that all there is to simultaneity is the
reception of a light signal under certain
conditions. Einstein makes an absolutely
lucid and compelling argument for RDS
that begins with the rejection of absolute
motion. But, once we have accepted that
there is such a thing as spacetime, how can
we buy into the rest of Einstein’s argument
for RDS?  In the B-theory, all of the
spacetime points are out there.50 The events
that occur in spacetime or the properties
instantiated at each point are real. The
major virtue of the theory lies in utilizing
these facts to ground a simple and elegant
semantics for tensed language. Once we
have accepted that there are such facts, why
would we continue to think that the only
relations that exist between events are the
ones that could be detected though the
measurement of a signal by an observer
within space-time? As we saw in section
1, the only real argument for RDS involves
the rejection of absolute rest on the grounds
that we have no reason to accept it and
that we can do without it. It seems to me
that the B-theorist must reject both of these
assumptions. Presumably the B-theorist
holds that there are good reasons to be-
lieve that spacetime really exists. If
spacetime really exists, then so does abso-
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lute motion relative to spacetime, regard-
less of whether or not it is empirically veri-
fiable.51 If there is such a thing as motion
relative to spacetime, then it seems natural
to think that there may be such a thing as
absolute simultaneity, regardless of whether
or not it is in principle verifiable. If we think
that there is a real thing out in the world
called spacetime in which events occur and
objects move, it no longer seems plausible
that the only temporal relations that exist
between these events are the ones that
might be measured by RDS.52
Einstein, in his revolutionary 1905 pa-
per, might have thought that the best ex-
planation for why absolute rest and simul-
taneity remained undetected was that they
do not exist. The acceptance of spacetime,
however, gives us a powerful alternative
explanation that seems equally plausible.
Ultimately, this explanation has to do with
the geometry of spacetime.53 Perhaps the
shape of spacetime conspires against us to
conceal these facts.54
CONCLUSION
The relativity objection is that the A-
theory is inconsistent with SR because it is
inconsistent with RDS. The strongest rea-
son, if not the only reason, to accept RDS
comes from the supposed dispensability of
the Newtonian concepts of absolute rest
and simultaneity. It is not clear, however,
from a metaphysical point of view, that the
concepts really are dispensable. They may
play an important theoretical role in our
understanding of certain possible worlds.
If the B-theorist is to make the objection
persuasive, there is more work to be done.
What is needed is some argument for RDS
as a metaphysically adequate account of
simultaneity. Furthermore, it seems unclear
that the B-theory of time is compatible with
RDS. Taking the realist attitude toward
spacetime that the B-theory requires seems
not only to undercut any reason for accept-
ing RDS, but also seems to give us a rea-
son to reject it. Perhaps there is some way
for the B-theorist to patch things up and
render the objection cogent, but as things
stand, it seems entirely unpersuasive.
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relationship, i.e. a proposition of the form ‘x is
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49Or some GR spacetime of which Minkowski
is an approximation.
50Spacetime does explanatory work. One of
the more impressive arguments for accepting
Minkowsky spacetime over a Neo-Lorentzian
spacetime is that Minkowski spacetime explains
“the fact that the laws effectively governing dif-
ferent sorts of matter all share the property of
Lorentz invariance”, whereas this fact is left un-
explained in the A-theoretically friendly neo-
lorentzian interpretations. It also provides us with
an explanation of why Newtonian simultaneity is
unverifiable (Balashov & Janssen 2003, pg 24).
For a response see (Nasmith, 2011).
51Tooly, 1997, 335.
52I want to leave open the possibility that the
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panding. The rate at which space is expanding
has the same measurement, regardless of one’s
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sibly could be used by the A-theorist to empiri-
cally uncover the privileged frame of reference.
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